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THE LEGAL STATUS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF PRIVATE INTERNET USERS UNDER THE 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: A PRIMER 
 FOR THE UNWARY ON THE SHAPE OF  
LAW TO COME 
MICHAEL H. HOFFMAN* 
When a nation, terrorist group, or other adversary attacks the United 
States through cyberspace, the U.S. response need not be limited to 
criminal prosecution. The United States reserves the right to respond 
in an appropriate manner. The United States will be prepared for such 
contingencies.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The terms cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism have gained currency over the 
past decade. Most forms of Internet misconduct tend to be categorized as 
cyber-crime. Manipulations involving cyberspace that might have lethal 
consequences (e.g. hacking into the control system for a dam to unleash a 
flood) and large denial of service attacks are characterized as cyber-terrorism. 
Nevertheless, there are times when hostile use of the Internet by state actors 
might not inherently constitute criminal behavior. Even when consequences 
could prove life threatening, these acts might not be deemed to constitute 
terrorism. These would be situations where the Internet has been turned into 
a virtual battlefield, thus regulated by the law of armed conflict and breaches 
of law punishable as war crimes. 
Assumptions offered here are qualified in that they look at future 
scenarios, but they are all realistic. If these assumptions are correct, then avid 
private users of the Internet (meaning those who are using the Internet in a 
personal rather than governmental capacity) need to be aware that their 
online activities may have consequences, legal and otherwise, that go far 
beyond anything they may have imagined. Efforts to provide virtual 
 * Michael H. Hoffman is an attorney with nearly twenty-years of private, public, civil, and 
military experience as a practitioner in the law of armed conflict. He has written extensively on legal 
aspects of terrorism, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and armed 
conflict. He can be reached via e-mail at michhof@comcast.net. 
 1. White House, National Security Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb [hereinafter National Security Strategy]. 
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solidarity with a foreign nation, or with a far away cause that has captured 
their sympathy may, in the end, lead to capture and detention as a prisoner of 
war or worse. Likewise, cyber-conduct that private Internet users may regard 
as a patriotic gesture in support of their nation could, conceivably, transform 
them into combatants and possibly lawful targets for a military response.  
In addition to hazards that might be waiting for Internet users when they 
wander into virtual war zones, there may be other risks as well. Some states, 
under the guise of countering cyber-terrorism or cyber-warfare, might be 
tempted to abuse and misappropriate the law of armed conflict in an effort to 
suppress free expression and exchange of ideas. This Essay reviews the 
basics of the law of armed conflict and then considers its applicability in 
cyber-space, with particular reference to private citizens who use the Internet 
in a manner that might ensnare them in warfare and its legal consequences.  
This Essay is speculative in the sense that the law of armed conflict has 
not yet been extended to cover warfare waged over the World Wide Web. 
Therefore, potential risks posed for private-citizen users of the Internet are 
based on an extrapolation from existing principles of the law of armed 
conflict. It is, however, a modest extrapolation. Private-citizen Internet users 
who want to protect themselves in the cyber-realm will be well served to 
assume that the line of thinking presented in this Essay reflects the shape of 
law to come.  
THE FAMILIAR LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNET HAZARDS 
Most Internet users think in terms of cyber-crime when they consider 
wrongdoing that takes place using the World Wide Web. United States 
legislation illustrates the legal parameters for that framework. Broadly stated, 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act2 prohibits use of computers, without 
authorization, to obtain official information protected against unauthorized 
disclosure; to obtain information from financial institutions in furtherance of 
a fraudulent scheme; to transmit a program, code or command that damages 
a computer; to gain unauthorized access to a computer with damage 
resulting; to traffick in passwords with intent to defraud. 
Internet users who employ computer technology for such ends will, 
increasingly, find themselves at risk for arrest and prosecution around the 
world. Such crimes will continue to be addressed through law enforcement 
channels and the judicial process. Consider, for example, this recent policy 
formulation announced by the U.S. government:  
 2. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(7) (2003). 
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The Nation will seek to prevent, deter, and significantly reduce cyber 
attacks by ensuring the identification of actual or attempted 
perpetrators followed by an appropriate government response. In the 
case of cyber crime this would include swift apprehension, and 
appropriately severe punishment.3 
But not every form of potential jeopardy attaches through domestic 
criminal codes or civil liability for damages resulting from such misconduct.4  
Internet users motivated by idealism (or their notions of idealism) or 
patriotism, could be inspired to use the Internet for purposes that extend 
beyond the realm of lawful exchange of ideas, beyond the scope of criminal 
law, and into a realm sometimes known as the law of war. It has already 
come close to happening. 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT—A QUICK SURVEY  
The body of international law that concerns us here is identified by more 
than one name. Traditionally, the law that regulated means and methods of 
warfare and established constraints on the behavior of combatants was called 
the “law of war.” In the twentieth century, it also came to be known as the 
“law of armed conflict.” Both of these terms are favored by armed forces. 
This law is also sometimes known as “international humanitarian law.” 
There is some dispute as to whether international humanitarian law and the 
law of armed conflict cover precisely the same ground. In modern treaty law 
and state practice, the term “armed conflict” is preferred to “war” because it 
more broadly describes an actual state of armed hostilities, as opposed to the 
legal state of affairs known as war, which requires a formal declaration.  
The law of armed conflict applies in full during interstate armed conflict. 
The treaty-based provisions for intrastate armed conflict are more limited in 
scope. Article Three Common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,5 
sometimes known as a mini-Geneva Convention, includes broad principles 
of humanitarian protection for non-international armed conflict including 
prohibitions on murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, taking of 
hostages, humiliating treatment, punishment without due process, 
requirement of humane treatment for those who are wounded, sick, or 
detained, and a provision that an impartial humanitarian body such as the 
 3. National Security Strategy, supra, note 2, at 28.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I]. 
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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) may offer its services.6 
Though international armed conflict is our main focus, a few additional 
observations will first be made about the law of internal armed conflict. 
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 19777
 
 
 expands the 
legal protections that apply during internal armed conflicts. The law 
continues to develop, with some contending that many of the rules for 
international armed conflict now apply to internal armed conflict as well. A 
trend to apply new treaty-based rules to internal as well as international 
armed conflict can also be discerned.8 
That such debate and development continues demonstrates that the law of 
armed conflict is an evolving body of law. New treaty-based restrictions on 
weaponry continue to develop (e.g. Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on 
their Destruction of 1997). Influential interpretation of the law has been 
handed down by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. New standards to regulate the 
conduct of hostilities may be emerging from the Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court. Some principles of international humanitarian 
law are already long established in treaty law, such as those that address the 
status and protection of medical workers, prisoners of war, civilians who are 
detained for security purposes or in occupied zones, and wounded and sick 
combatants.  
The full provisions of the law of armed conflict apply during interstate 
(between nations) armed conflict. They are found in many sources, including 
most notably the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 
1977.9 These treaties ensure that during interstate conflict, wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked members of the armed forces will receive medical care without 
regard to the party for which they fought. They provide that military captives 
will receive humane treatment, benefit from visits by representatives from a 
 6. Common article 3 is sometimes referred to as a mini-Geneva Convention, as its provisions 
capture the spirit of rules that apply more fully during international armed conflict. 
 7. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereinafter Protocol II]. 
 8. See, e.g., Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-traps and 
Other Devices as (Amended Protocol II), Oct. 13, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1206 (1996). 
 
 9. See Geneva I, supra note 5. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
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neutral nation (protecting power) or humanitarian organization (the ICRC 
plays a crucial role in implementing this facet of international humanitarian 
law) and exchange messages with their families on a regular basis. In 
addition, military captives are to be repatriated at the close of active 
hostilities. Likewise, civilians caught in a war zone are entitled to 
humanitarian assistance (again by the ICRC) and, when detained for security 
purposes, to protective visits by the ICRC or a protecting power and to 
services like those provided for prisoners of war.  
Targeting, an issue gaining in interest around the world, is a frequent 
subject of debate. Increasingly, it is a field that is also the subject of legal 
scrutiny. The law of targeting is not hard and fast because it can be difficult 
to target with absolute certainty in the fog of war. However, targeting law 
continues to develop and requires careful consideration. Broadly stated, 
civilian infrastructure not employed to support the war effort is protected 
from targeting. Such infrastructure, and more broadly the protection of the 
civilian population, is the principle focus in the debate on targeting.10 
It remains an open question whether and how international humanitarian 
law or the law of armed conflict applies in cyberspace. 
VISITING THE VIRTUAL WAR ZONE  
Those fortunate enough never to have been in a war zone may assume 
that such areas resemble the Western Front during World War I; a ravaged 
moonscape bristling with heavily armed fortifications. In point of fact, many 
war zones look nothing of the sort. Sometimes the unwary may wander 
through quiet residential areas or down scenic country roads without 
realizing that they are approaching or crossing the front-line of a battlefield. 
Internet users run the same risk. 
The law of armed conflict applies in war zones. To date, it is not 
established that cyberspace legally qualifies as a war zone. Cyberspace does 
not occupy a discernible geographic location, and the electronic attacks that 
impact combatants may be launched from or through networks in potentially 
neutral states where the authorities have no knowledge of the attack. 
Likewise, the attack could take place using platforms that have no obvious 
connection with traditional weaponry.11 The net result is that there is no 
 10. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998). For 
a study of the law of armed conflict as found in the Rome Statute, see LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE 
FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 129-71 (2002).  
 11. See Ruth G. Wedgwood, Proportionality, Cyberwar, and the Law of War, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 
219, 227 (2000); COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael N. Schmitt et al. 
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treaty that points to cyberspace as a place where the law of armed conflict 
applies. 
However, the law of armed conflict is built upon customary law. It only 
became rooted in treaty law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Even where there are no established treaty rules, the principles of the law of 
armed conflict nonetheless apply during interstate armed conflict.12 Rules of 
armed conflict have developed through state practice as well as through 
treaties. Total reliance on familiar, statutory-centered sources for new rules is 
not sufficient because such rules may emerge even in the absence of treaties. 
States may decide, before long, to apply familiar treaty-based rules of war 
by analogy to guide the use of cyberspace as a tool for war.13 Private-citizen 
users of the Internet should not assume that the law of armed conflict will not 
apply in cyber-war. Though interpretation of the law of armed conflict may 
differ among nations, modern state practice demonstrates that its rules will 
apply, in some form, even during international confrontations where 
governments are reluctant to acknowledge that warfare is actually 
underway.14 
Private citizen users of the Internet should assume that the law of armed 
conflict will develop to encompass belligerent acts committed on-line. While 
other war zones may require a substantial journey before one reaches the 
front lines, cyber-war zones can be entered without leaving a work station or 
place of residence located thousands of miles from the scene of traditional 
hostilities. It would be wise to consider the implications. 
eds., 2002).  
 12. This principle is enunciated in the famous Martens clause found in the Hague Conventions 
on land warfare of 1899 and 1907.  
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem 
it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the 
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the 
law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws 
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907, 1 Bevans 
(631) Convention (II) with Respect to the Land and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 1 
BEVANS 247.  
 13. For a careful analysis of the applicability of the law of armed conflict to computer network 
attacks launched by states see Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and the 
Jus in Bello, 846 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 365 (2002). 
 14. See generally Michael H. Hoffman, Peace-Enforcement Actions and Humanitarian Law: 
Emerging Rules of “Interventional Armed Conflict”, 82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 193-203 (2000). 
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IDENTIFYING CYBER-SPACE COMBATANTS  
Private citizens have already taken to cyberspace to lend their support, to 
one side or another, during international confrontations. In 2001, there were 
numerous private cyber-attacks launched between China and the United 
States during tensions following the collision between a U.S. surveillance 
flight and a Chinese fighter that subsequently resulted in an emergency 
landing by the U.S. crew.15 The Arab-Israeli confrontation has also led to 
conflict on the Internet, with supporters on each side attacking Web sites.16 In 
another instance, cyber-attacks were launched against diplomatic missions by 
an individual supporting or sympathizing with of an insurgent group during 
an internal armed conflict.17 
These events involving defacement of Web sites and spamming did not 
cross the yet to be defined legal threshold for cyber-warfare. However, an 
attack that disabled industrial sites, endangered public safety, or interfered 
with military operations might well establish that threshold. Those 
responsible for such attacks could discover that they have become 
combatants and, for that reason, a quick survey of the law of combatant 
status needs to be considered. 
During interstate conflict, members of a state’s armed forces qualify as 
combatants under international humanitarian law. Likewise, members of 
militias and organized resistance movements commanded by a person 
responsible for subordinates, who openly carry their arms, are readily 
identifiable by a fixed sign (identifier), and are subject to the laws and 
customs of war qualify as combatants.18 The status of insurgents during an 
internal armed conflict is problematic. They can be punished for taking up 
arms against the state provided that they receive the full protection of the 
law, but there is also the possibility of amnesty at the end of the conflict (and 
thus some implicit recognition as lawful combatants) if they conduct 
themselves in a manner that would encourage the authorities to grant 
leniency.19 
 15. Chinese Hackers Carry Through on Threats to Attack U.S. Web Sites (Apr. 30, 2001), 
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,18657,00.html; It’s an All-out Cyber War as U.S. 
Hackers Fight Back at China (May 1, 2001), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,19337,00.html. 
 16. Mideast Fighting Spills onto the Internet (Nov. 2, 2000), available at http://www.cnn.com/ 
2000/TECH/computing/11/02/mideast.webwar.  
 17. Second Incident of Cyber-Terrorism in Sri Lanka, at http://www.lankaweb.com/news/ 
items01/210501-2.html (last visited June 12, 2003). 
 18. See Geneva Convention I, art. 13; Geneva Convention II, art. 13; Geneva Convention III, art. 
4.  
 19. See Protocol II, art. 6(5).  
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As described earlier, those who qualify as combatants during interstate 
armed conflict enjoy a substantial measure of protection when they fall into 
the hands of an enemy. Though they can be held for the duration of active 
hostilities, unless severe health problems suggest an earlier release, they are 
not prisoners in the sense of being criminals. They can be detained, but not 
punished for having served their country in wartime. Members of armed 
forces as described in the Geneva Conventions would qualify for full 
protection. The fact that they are utilizing new technologies for military 
purposes would not deprive them of their lawful combatant status.  
There are certain categories of combatants whose actions are in fact 
prohibited by the laws and customs of war. Thus, participation in such 
activities deprives them of prisoner of war status and renders them 
susceptible to punishment for their activities if convicted “by an impartial 
and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles 
of regular judicial procedure. . . .”20 Spies and saboteurs represent categories 
of individuals who do not qualify for full protection under the law of armed 
conflict and may face punishment for their activities.21 Guerilla warfare was 
traditionally prohibited and punishable under the law of war, through an 
attempt has been made to define parameters for lawful guerrilla warfare in 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. This change has not been universally 
accepted and some states, including the United States, have not ratified 
Protocol I. 
Where might private Internet users fall within this existing legal 
structure? There is only one situation in which private citizens can 
spontaneously take up arms on their own initiative during an international 
armed conflict and attain the status of lawful combatants, and that is where:  
Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the 
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, 
without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, 
provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of 
war.22 
In any other circumstance, individuals who want to take up arms as 
lawful combatants must join a military unit that comes within the categories 
described in the Geneva Conventions (or Protocol I in cases where its 
 20. See Protocol I, art. 75(4). 
 21. See Geneva Convention IV, art. 5. See also Protocol I, art. 46. 
 22. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 5, art. 13; Geneva Convention II, art. 13; Geneva 
Convention III, art. 4.  
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provisions on guerrilla warfare have been accepted, via ratification, by the 
parties to the conflict).  
Such spontaneous organization is sometimes known as a levee’ en masse. 
Perhaps there will be situations where Internet users may organize 
themselves in an analogous manner to repel cyber-attacks on their country. 
However, if we extend the laws and customs of war by analogy to cover such 
cases, it will only apply to defensive measures. Cyber-attacks on the 
infrastructure or military capacities of another nation would go beyond the 
permissible operational scope of citizen participation in a levee’ en masse.  
To the extent that the existing framework of the law of armed conflict 
gives us some guidance on likely future trends, it seems that this will be the 
only context in which private Internet users would ever be able to stake a 
claim to lawful combatant status. Even that scenario for development of the 
law is speculative and, we might say, optimistic. As a general rule, private 
Internet users who decide to launch cyber-war attacks will, at best, find 
themselves classified as unlawful combatants.23 Identification as a 
combatant, lawful or otherwise, brings with it practical issues and 
consequences.  
IMPLICATIONS OF IDENTIFICATION AS A COMBATANT 
Most private Internet users are aware that activities prohibited by the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act expose them to criminal investigation, 
prosecution, and penal sanction. However, if they engage in cyber-activities 
that states determine to constitute hostile military actions, there will be other, 
less familiar consequences to consider. The threshold between conventional 
computer crime and cyber-activities constituting hostile acts under the law of 
armed conflict will be difficult to determine. Sabotaging a server might be a 
“conventional” crime (to the extent computer crime has become 
conventional). At some still legally undefined point, an assault on computer 
networks, or infrastructure that depends on computer networks, will be 
considered to have morphed into a military assault. Private Internet users 
probe for that threshold at their own risk, with the potential for penalty under 
criminal law in some cases, under the law of armed conflict in others, and 
under both if their acts are deemed to constitute war crimes.  
 23. “Unlawful combatants” is terminology found in Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) and 
not a term of art recognized in international humanitarian law. However, it is one of a variety of terms 
that have been used in efforts to describe, in legal terms, actors who engage in armed conflict without 
the legal authority and protection that is accorded to lawful combatants and are, therefore, susceptible 
to be tried and punished for their activities. Other terms and descriptions that have been used for the 
same purpose include irregular combatants, belligerent disqualification, and marauding.  
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If captured in circumstances where it is determined that Internet activities 
qualify the individual as a combatant under the law of armed conflict (a 
scenario unlikely to occur when the user is acting as a private citizen), that 
private Internet belligerent might be held as a prisoner of war. As such, the 
actor would enjoy no right to counsel, nor access to courts to challenge 
detention. The user would be entitled to protective visits as a prisoner of war, 
as described previously, but could be held until the cessation of active 
hostilities.  
If a user’s captor should determine that private Internet warfare qualifies 
as a form of unlawful belligerency, they may then find themselves placed on 
trial for that offense. Whether deemed a lawful or unlawful belligerent or 
combatant, the private Internet user would also face the additional prospect 
of trial for war crimes if their targeting, or the damage engaging cyber-
attacks, constitutes a war crime. For example, a computer virus launched to 
disrupt hospital services may be considered analogous to a conventional 
weapons attack against the same site that would be unlawful under the 
established law of armed conflict.  
Ultimately, combatants engaging in cyber-warfare, lawful or otherwise, 
might find themselves a target for the use of lethal force. This is unlikely 
where a belligerent state can prevail on another nation to shut down activities 
taking place in neutral territory. In those circumstances, private Internet users 
could well find themselves facing prosecution by their own government for 
violation of domestic neutrality legislation as well as other criminal 
offenses.24 However, cyber-attacks launched from a location that cannot be 
reached through diplomatic or law enforcement channels might eventually be 
deemed to constitute a military threat susceptible to traditional military 
operations.  
Likewise, private Internet users who get involved in cyber-attacks on the 
computer infrastructure of their own country may be considered insurgents 
involved in non-international armed conflict if such assaults support a group 
engaging in hostilities against the state. Depending on how state practice 
evolves, particularly damaging cyber-attacks may come to be recognized as a 
form of armed rebellion even where there are no conventional hostilities 
underway. Depending on the domestic law of the country concerned, Internet 
users may, in addition to criminal charges familiar in a peacetime context, 
face the prospect of trial for insurrection and war crimes. 
 24. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2003). This legislation has a venerable lineage dating back to 
1794. It may or may not be sufficiently current to address private cyber-attacks by U.S. citizens or 
others residing in the United States, but it gives a sense of domestic law related risks run by private 
Internet users if they try to intervene in conflicts where their own country remains neutral. 
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The message here is that it will be best to stay away from cyber-war 
zones (regardless of how such zones come to be conceptualized) and refrain 
from any Internet activities that might be characterized as a new form of 
armed belligerency. However, there are times when Internet users need to 
remain vigilant so that emerging notions of cyber-war do not impinge on the 
free exchange of ideas and peaceful use of the Web.  
IF STATES ABUSE THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT TO SUPPRESS INTERNET 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Information and comment sent by way of the Internet will, in exceptional 
circumstances, cross a line from peaceful exchange of ideas to acts arguably 
military in character. Propaganda efforts, sometimes also known as 
psychological operations, are a form of warfare designed to destabilize and 
undermine enemy efforts and morale. Members of armed forces engaged in 
psychological operations are combatants. Private Internet users who decide 
to spread false information or rumors in order to undermine military or 
related national security efforts run the risk of drifting into combatant status 
if their activities should be found to qualify as psychological operations.  
However, such uses of the Internet will be miniscule in comparison with 
peacetime use for dialogue, information sharing, and commerce. Freedom of 
expression has been enshrined in the developing law of human rights for over 
two hundred years.25 In the twentieth century, this right expanded beyond 
domestic, constitutional sources and found its way into international law as 
well.26 
Private Internet users who understand the importance of the World Wide 
Web as an instrument of freedom will not want to see it used in a manner that 
undermines this vital purpose. At the same time, private Internet users and 
human rights practitioners will need to remain vigilant against attempts to 
suppress freedom of expression by states that may misuse the law of armed 
conflict to claim that exchanges of ideas and information, via the Web, 
somehow constitute acts of belligerency. 
 25. See Fr. Const. of 1791, Title I; CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY 86 (Albert P. 
Blaustein & Jay A. Sigler eds., 1988); see also U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (1791).  
 26. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).  
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CONCLUSION 
The World Wide Web has obviously spurred a communications 
revolution. In shrinking the world, it is also gradually opening a portal for 
easy access to war zones and remote participation in hostilities. Virtual visits 
to war zones and incidents of hostile use of the Internet will likely be 
followed, if not accompanied by evolving standards in the law of armed 
conflict that turn some private Internet users into combatants with all the 
legal and security consequences that follow. Private users of the World Wide 
Web are well advised to avoid becoming test cases on application of the law 
of armed conflict to the Internet. They should, instead, contribute their 
efforts, talents, and energy to peaceful development of this vital new 
medium. 
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